



CHECK POINT

Most Competitive

PENTERA

62

GTLM

PENTERA



CORTEX

FORTINET

dns

MICHELIN

PENTERA

etický hacker jako software

Lukáš Engler



Infrastruktura firem

Interní

Security

Monitoring

SIEM/XDR/SOAR

Network Monitoring

NTA/NDR

Endpoint Controls

EDR/EPP/NGAV

Data Controls


DLP

Network Controls

Firewall

Endpoints & Internal

Networks



Externí

External Perimeter Controls

IDS/IPS

External Applications Control

WAF / FW

Domains & Assets

Remote Access

VPN

Network Controls

Web Gateway / Load Balancing

Jak ověřit reálný stav bezpečnosti infrastruktury?



Existuje nějaké řešení?




Pentera

- Izrael, 2015
- 330+ zaměstnanců
- 800+ zákazníků
- 50+ zemí globálně




Pentera

- automatická platforma pro validaci kybernetické bezpečnosti (ASV)
- nesimuluje, **reálně validuje bezpečnost**
- kontrola jakéhokoliv bezpečnostního řešení
- není to jen o zranitelnostech, ale i **nastavení**



Co všechno PENTERA Core dělá?

- bez nutnosti instalace agenta
- reálné, bezpečné postupy
- autonomní, komplexní
- žádná simulace



Jak to prakticky funguje

Blackbox/Greybox


- Půjdu a zapojím Penteru do uživatelské sítě.
- Po 10 minutách zachycuji první uživatelské přístupové údaje.
- Jednou za pár hodin rozhoduji, jaké akce může Pentera provést.
- V řádu hodin mám většinou první prolomené uživatele.
- Dostáváme se ke sdíleným složkám, heslům prohlížečů, emailům...

AD assessment

- (typicky 30% prolomených hesel)

demo





Targeted Testing

Use predefined testing scenarios to easily perform targeted penetration tests or build your own targeted scenarios using the advanced options

- ✓ Info
- ✓ Ranges
- ✓ Attack Interface Selection
- ✓ Credentials for Initial Access
- ✓ Settings
- ✓ Scheduling and Duration

✓ Notifications

Testing Scenario Email Notifications

✓ Residue Cleanup

As soon as the test ends, Pentera automatically removes and reverts all changes made during the test.

Provide credentials below to be used exclusively for cleanup after this Testing Scenario. These will be used instead of Cleanup users defined in [Environment tab](#).

Recommended Privileges

Local Administrator group member on tested machines.

Add User

Edit User



| <input type="checkbox"/> | Username ↓ | Type | Platform | Domain | DC |
|--------------------------|------------|--------|----------|-------------|----|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | veritas | Domain | Windows | PENTERA.LAB | |

Results per page: 25 ▾ 1-1 of 1 < 1 of 1 >

Run Template

NOTE

Add users with local/domain admin privileges for Pentera to automatically cleanup and remove residues upon completion of your testing scenarios. Domain admin accounts provide the best outcomes and help to optimize successful cleanup



302 ACHIEVEMENTS

112 VULNERABILITIES

4.6 Injected XSS payload 5

4.3 Found domain users with LAPS permissions on host 15

4.0 Accessed shared folder(s) 9

3.5 Validated local credentials 3

3.4 Uploaded malware to host 5

Host: 192.168.110.33

Host: 192.168.110.32

Host: 192.168.110.35

Target: 192.168.110.33

Target: 192.168.110.33

3.4 Uploaded malware to host via LOLBAS 11

3.3 Opened remote control channel on the host 46

2.8 Revealed domain's groups and users 5

Details

🏆 | 3.4 Uploaded malware to host

Parameters

Host: 192.168.110.33

User: william

Password: ****

Domain: pentera

Results

INJECTED FILES - 1




| Filename | Path |
|-----------|---|
| TtqCb.dll | C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3 |

302 ACHIEVEMENTS

112 VULNERABILITIES

- 0.0 Escalated privileges
- 7.9 Emulated deletion of shadow copies
- 7.2 Executed code remotely on the host
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.32
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.35
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
- 7.2 Enumerated files on the host
- 7.1 Found a user with privileged RCE capabilities
- 7.0 Potential credentials were found in script file(s)
- 6.4 Detected Java deserializable object
- 6.4 Detected ASP.NET deserializable object



Details

7.2 Executed code remotely on the host

Parameters

Domain: 192.168.110.33
 Host: 192.168.110.33
 User: pentera_s1b5oxhylr
 Password: ****

Results

Engine: Powershell
 Obfuscation Method: FOR_COMMAND
 Obfuscation Level: BASIC
 Command: set
 qKyP=8xNIW=340tYlJSegs7JR.yKwMVG5Zpc2nE-odiF1Qubz9kCHaml/fDBUAhTXOPv&&for %W in (29,35,23,33,19,16,58,14,51,11,20,14,1,33,36,34,4,3,32,54,61,23,36,48,3,54,54,33,32,36,34,33,60,33,30,56,59,3,35,32,29,36,55,10,62,57,13,13,36,34,16,9,49,36,34,32,61,62,19,35,53,3,11,14,36,34,14,32,30,35,37,14,37,30,35,24,50,49,2,37,36,28,15,55,62,57,39,3,57,28,41,55,55,57,26,24,57,13,57,57,35,5,7,47,41,57,56,57,57,15,57,33,46,57,59,15,57,15,57,54,41,57,2,57,57,44,57,47,23,57,24,41,57,44,57,5,4,15,57,11,57,57,7,57,54,57,57,61,57,57,23,57,47,23,57,2,57,57,1,57,54,56,57,2,41,57,1,57,47,46,57,14,23,55,56,57,48,3,57,4,41,55,17,57,47,41,57,37,23,57,45,57,33,7,57,19,41,55,6,57,47,8,57,43,23,5,5,47,57,26,35,57,28,41,55,18,57,48,41,57,3,57,55,44,57,39,46,57,56,23,55,8,57,33,56,57,43,41,57,42,57,26,7,57,28,41,55,56,57,47,7,57,37,23,55,39,57,33,3,57,10,23,55,24,57,26,46,57,19,41,55,61,57,48,41,57,61,23,57,46,57,48,30,57,11,15,55,46,57,33,0,57,25,23,55,61,57,33,23,57,43,23,55,55,57,26,41,57,56,23,55,8,57,48,3,57,49,41,55,61,57,26,30,57,22,57,57,32,57,26,15,57,25,57,55,8,57,39,57,57,61,15,57,63,57,47,0,57,24,41,57,27,57,54,3,57,11,15,57,1,57,54,10,57,61,57,57,42,57,54,33,57,24,41,57,23,57,47,7,57,24,41,57,23,57,54,35,57,14,23,57,2

Conti Ransomware Campaign

REvil Ransomware Campaign

MAZE Ransomware Campaign

Lockbit 2.0 Ransomware Campaign

MS08-067 Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption

Malicious C2 Traffic

ARP Poisoning

Cached Credentials

DHCP Spoofing

Binary-less Exploitation - Powershell

Name Resolution Protocols (LLMNR/NBNS/mDNS)

Living off the Land Binaries

Privileged User Management in a Windows Domain

LDAPS Relay Prevention/Detection

MS-SAMR Protocol

MS17-010 Eternal Blue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption

Stop Service

Conti campaigns stop live services on Windows hosts to undermine the ability to recover data from the encryption process. Stop services is usually achieved by executing the following commands:

Code Block

```
net stop "Acronis VSS Provider" /y
net stop "Enterprise Client Service" /y
net stop "SQLsafe Backup Service" /y
net stop "SQLsafe Filter Service" /y
net stop "Veeam Backup Catalog Data Service" /y
net stop AcronisAgent /y
```

File System Artifacts

The following file system artifacts are often observed in sequence on hosts attacked by Conti campaigns.

| Step | Operation | Purpose |
|------|------------------------------|---|
| 1 | CreateFile | Opens the document for reading and writing. |
| 2 | ReadFile | Reads data from the document. |
| 3 | WriteFile | Writes encrypted data onto the document. |
| 4 | WriteFile | Adds key blob to encrypted document at the end of the file. |
| 5 | CloseFile | Closes encrypted document. |
| 6 | CreateFile (Read Attributes) | Opens encrypted document. |
| 7 | SetRenameInformationFile | Renames document to add an attack-identifier as the file extension. |
| 8 | CloseFile | Closes encrypted document. |

>

Supplemental Material

[Conti_URL.txt](#)
[Conti_HASH.txt](#)

References

- <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a>
- <https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-conti-ransomware>
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/vision-one-tracking-conti-ransomware.html
- <https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/>
- <https://blog.minerva-labs.com/conti-ransomware-built-to-bypass-edrs-prevented-by-minerva>
- <https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/02/16/conti-ransomware-evasive-by-nature/>
- <https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/adversary/wizard-spider/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102/>

Jak se sám sebe ptát

- Dáte hlavu na špalek, že vaše infrastruktura je 100% neprolomitelná?
- Jste schopni si nechávat kontinuálně validovat celou infrastrukturu?
- Dovedete jasně říci, v jakých oblastech má obrana vašeho ekosystému reálné mezery?

*Pokud jsou vaše odpovědi **NE**, najdete nás u stánku DNS.*

*Pokud jste odpovídali **ANO**, vyhledejte mě také, budu na vás mít spoustu otázek.*

Děkuji za pozornost

